| Peer-Reviewed

The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories

Received: 8 February 2021     Accepted: 8 April 2021     Published: 23 April 2021
Views:       Downloads:
Abstract

Against the informational and propositional character of knowledge, the idea that understanding is not a form of knowledge will be developed, since it is related to veritism and reliability, while understanding (comprehension) has to do with explanatory, objectual, technical relations, as coherentism had suggested for the problem of justification. The turn in epistemology has to do with the problem of the value of knowledge, now in terms of understanding, since this gives order and systematicity to thought. Then it will be argued that the fundamental feature of science is representational capacity, and the means to represent are not true beliefs but modeling, that is, functional theoretical models as idealization of the most relevant characteristics, leaving aside those that are not, depending on the objectives. Finally, the thesis is defended that mental experiments do not generate knowledge but rather broaden scientific understanding, understanding this as the most important cognitive achievement. In other words, mental experiments are a narrative way of generating mobile models of scientific theories. Mental experiments should be understood as actions of thought that allow to deepen a theory, to refute a hypothesis, but mainly have didactic functions of explanatory nature. Mental experiments contribute to understanding and rely heavily on imagination and narrative. Mental experiments are a very useful cognitive tool since, not being true, they allow fictitious approximations that can be refined in terms of their adequacy to the theoretical models.

Published in Science Journal of Education (Volume 9, Issue 2)
DOI 10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12
Page(s) 32-39
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Scientific Theories, Understanding, Thought Experiments, Scientific Models, Cognition

References
[1] BRENDEL, E. (2003): “Pompas de intuición y el uso adecuado de los experimentos mentales”, en Ideas y Valores, N. 123, Diciembre de 2003, Bogotá Colombia.
[2] ELGIN, K. (2011): “Del conocimiento al entendimiento”, en Normas, valores y virtudes epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Margarita Valdés y M. A. Fernández (compiladores), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
[3] FERRARIS, M. (2007): Goodbye, Kant! Que queda hoy de la Crítica de la razón pura, Editorial Losada.
[4] FRICKER, M. (2011): “El valor del conocimiento y la prueba del tiempo”, en Normas, valores y virtudes epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Margarita Valdés y M. A. Fernández (compiladores), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
[5] HAACK, S. (2012): “La unidad de la verdad y la pluralidad de las verdades”, en Teorías contemporáneas de la verdad, Tecnos.
[6] KVANVIG, J. (2011): “Conocimiento y entendimiento”, en Normas, valores y virtudes epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Margarita Valdés y M. A. Fernández (compiladores), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
[7] NERCESSIAN, N. (2018):”En el laboratorio del teórico: la experimentación mental como construcción de modelos mentales”, en Trabajando en el laboratorio de la mente: naturaleza y alcance de los experimentos mentales, UASLP Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Facultad de ciencias sociales y Humanidades, México.
[8] NORTON, J. (2018): “Por qué los experimentos mentales no trascienden el empirismo”, en Trabajando en el laboratorio de la mente: naturaleza y alcance de los experimentos mentales, UASLP Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Facultad de ciencias sociales y Humanidades, México.
[9] ORNELAS, J. (2016): “Un estudio metafilosófico de la metodología científica”, en Praxis filosófica. Nueva serie, N. 43, Universidad del Valle.
[10] ROMERO-CHACÓN, A. E. (2017): La experimentación en la clase de ciencias. Aportes a una enseñanza de las ciencias contextualizada con reflexiones metacientíficas, editorial Universidad de Antioquia.
[11] ROSALENY, R. (2017): Problemas de la teoría del conocimiento. Una introducción a la epistemología contemporánea, Universidad de Antioquia.
[12] STREVENS, M. (2017): “How Idealizations Provide Understanding”, in Explaining Understanding. New perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Edited by Sptephen R. Grimm, C. Baumberger and S. Ammon, Routledge, New York.
[13] STUART, M. (2018): “How thought experiments increase understanding”, in The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments, Edited by T. Stuart, Y. Fehige and J. Brown, Routledge Philosophy companions, 2018.
[14] TUFFANELLI, L. (2010): “La comprensión como problema”, en Comprender. Qué es? cómo funciona? ediciones Narcea.
[15] VILLORO, L. (2006): Creer, conocer, saber, Siglo XXI editores.
[16] ZAGZEBSKI, L., (2011): “La búsqueda de la fuente del valor epistémico”, en Normas, valores y virtudes epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Margarita Valdés y M. A. Fernández (compiladores), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Juan Carlos Vélez Rengifo. (2021). The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories. Science Journal of Education, 9(2), 32-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12

    Copy | Download

    ACS Style

    Juan Carlos Vélez Rengifo. The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories. Sci. J. Educ. 2021, 9(2), 32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12

    Copy | Download

    AMA Style

    Juan Carlos Vélez Rengifo. The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories. Sci J Educ. 2021;9(2):32-39. doi: 10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12

    Copy | Download

  • @article{10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12,
      author = {Juan Carlos Vélez Rengifo},
      title = {The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories},
      journal = {Science Journal of Education},
      volume = {9},
      number = {2},
      pages = {32-39},
      doi = {10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.sjedu.20210902.12},
      abstract = {Against the informational and propositional character of knowledge, the idea that understanding is not a form of knowledge will be developed, since it is related to veritism and reliability, while understanding (comprehension) has to do with explanatory, objectual, technical relations, as coherentism had suggested for the problem of justification. The turn in epistemology has to do with the problem of the value of knowledge, now in terms of understanding, since this gives order and systematicity to thought. Then it will be argued that the fundamental feature of science is representational capacity, and the means to represent are not true beliefs but modeling, that is, functional theoretical models as idealization of the most relevant characteristics, leaving aside those that are not, depending on the objectives. Finally, the thesis is defended that mental experiments do not generate knowledge but rather broaden scientific understanding, understanding this as the most important cognitive achievement. In other words, mental experiments are a narrative way of generating mobile models of scientific theories. Mental experiments should be understood as actions of thought that allow to deepen a theory, to refute a hypothesis, but mainly have didactic functions of explanatory nature. Mental experiments contribute to understanding and rely heavily on imagination and narrative. Mental experiments are a very useful cognitive tool since, not being true, they allow fictitious approximations that can be refined in terms of their adequacy to the theoretical models.},
     year = {2021}
    }
    

    Copy | Download

  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - The Importance of Thought Experiments in Understanding Scientific Theories
    AU  - Juan Carlos Vélez Rengifo
    Y1  - 2021/04/23
    PY  - 2021
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12
    DO  - 10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12
    T2  - Science Journal of Education
    JF  - Science Journal of Education
    JO  - Science Journal of Education
    SP  - 32
    EP  - 39
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2329-0897
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.sjedu.20210902.12
    AB  - Against the informational and propositional character of knowledge, the idea that understanding is not a form of knowledge will be developed, since it is related to veritism and reliability, while understanding (comprehension) has to do with explanatory, objectual, technical relations, as coherentism had suggested for the problem of justification. The turn in epistemology has to do with the problem of the value of knowledge, now in terms of understanding, since this gives order and systematicity to thought. Then it will be argued that the fundamental feature of science is representational capacity, and the means to represent are not true beliefs but modeling, that is, functional theoretical models as idealization of the most relevant characteristics, leaving aside those that are not, depending on the objectives. Finally, the thesis is defended that mental experiments do not generate knowledge but rather broaden scientific understanding, understanding this as the most important cognitive achievement. In other words, mental experiments are a narrative way of generating mobile models of scientific theories. Mental experiments should be understood as actions of thought that allow to deepen a theory, to refute a hypothesis, but mainly have didactic functions of explanatory nature. Mental experiments contribute to understanding and rely heavily on imagination and narrative. Mental experiments are a very useful cognitive tool since, not being true, they allow fictitious approximations that can be refined in terms of their adequacy to the theoretical models.
    VL  - 9
    IS  - 2
    ER  - 

    Copy | Download

Author Information
  • Departamento de Ciencias Del Comportamiento, Universidad Católica Lumen Gentium, Cali, Colombia

  • Sections